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Empirical Tests of the Refutable Implications of Expected Utility 
Maximization under Risk 
Yucan Liu and C. Richard Shumway
  
Abstract:  
The curvature properties of the indirect utility function imply a set of refutable 
implications in the form of comparative static results and symmetric relations for the 
competitive firm operating under uncertainty. These hypotheses, first derived and 
empirically tested under output price uncertainty by Saha and Shumway (1998), are 
extended in this paper to the more general case of both price and quantity uncertainty and 
result in an important theoretical finding. Empirical tests using a panel of state-level 
observations fail to reject most refutable hypotheses under output price and output 
quantity risk, but symmetry conditions implied by a twice-continuously-differentiable 
indirect utility function are rejected. Two restrictive risk preference hypotheses are also 
rejected. At individual observations, data were consistent with most of the hypotheses 
implied by individual states acting as though they were expected utility-maximizing firms.     
Key words: indirect utility function, refutable implications, risk and uncertainty 
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Empirical Tests of the Refutable Implications of Expected Utility 
Maximization under Risk 
I. Introduction 
  Because of the long time periods between commitment of resources and 
generation of marketable output in production agriculture, a high level of uncertainty is 
associated with many production decisions. Consequently, economists concerned about 
decision making in production agriculture have had a long history of considering the 
impact of risk and uncertainty.  
  Building on the early work of Sandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974), who 
developed the theory of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty, agricultural 
economists have examined firm operations under various sources of uncertainty. The 
pioneering work of Pope (1980) derived various testable hypotheses expressed in 
symmetry and homogeneity results under constant absolute risk aversion and price 
uncertainty. His symmetry results proved simple enough for empirical application under 
certain classes of utility functions (Antonovitz and Roe, 1986). Chavas and Pope (1985) 
extended Pope’s work by examining price uncertainty within a general risk preference 
framework which facilitated empirical tests of firm behavior under the expected utility 
hypothesis. Paris (1988), Paris, Caputo and Holloway (1993), and Adrangi and Raffiee 
(1999) derived testable implications within a comparative statics framework for the 
competitive firm operating under price uncertainty. Saha and Shumway (1998) derived 
refutable implications from the first-order and second-order curvature properties of the  3
dual function under output price uncertainty and empirically tested each postulate for 
Kansas wheat producers. 
  The purpose of this paper is to: (a) extend the previous theoretical work by careful 
derivation of refutable and testable implications of the indirect utility function under both 
output price and quantity risk, (b) demonstrate that one previously maintained hypothesis 
is not a necessary condition for the derived implications, and (c) empirically test the 
derived implications as well as a set of hypotheses about the nature of risk aversion 
practiced by producers.   
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief 
overview of the behavioral theory implied by the curvature properties of the indirect 
utility function and derives a set of testable hypotheses. An empirical application follows 
along with a description of the data. Conclusions are presented in the last section. 
II. The Theoretical Model 
  Traditionally, the introduction of price uncertainty into the theory of the 
competitive firm has been approached within an expected utility framework. The seminal 
works of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) defined preferences of expected utility-
maximizing decision makers over final wealth. Despite their unambiguous reference to 
final wealth, much of the analysis of risk taking behavior of agricultural producers, 
beginning with Sandmo (1971), has used profit rather than wealth as the argument of 
utility (Meyer and Meyer, 1998). Profit is the appropriate argument only if sources of 
wealth other than profit are nonrandom and held fixed. Since we do not wish to impose 
nonrandom constraints on other sources of wealth, we use wealth as the argument of  4
utility in the following theoretical model.  Therefore, the firm is assumed to maximize its 
expected utility of random wealth.  
  Following Feder (1977) and Saha and Shumway (1998), we assume that a 
competitive firm’s random wealth W % can be structured as a nonrandom part Z(·), a 
random component S(·), and nonrandom initial (beginning of period) wealth endowment I:                             
(1)         ( ;β,) ( ; ;) I , =⋅ +⋅ + % % WZ S ε xx                                                                                           
where  x=(x1, x2,…, xn)’ is an  1 n×  vector of decision variables, ε% is a random variable 
vector, β is a parameter vector, and · denotes the additional parameters concealed in Z(·) 
and S(·). The parameters, β, only enter the nonrandom part of wealth, Z(·), but not the 
random part S(·). Although we later demonstrate that it is unnecessary for our refutable 
implications to hold under output price and output quantity risk, we initially maintain the 
standard expectation: 
(2)         E[ ( ; ; )] 0, ⋅= % S ε x                                                                                                  
where E denotes the expectation operator. 
  Conditional on twice-differentiable functions of Z and S, the expectation of 
random wealth defined by (1) and (2) can be written as:   
  
(3)         E( )
                 ( ;β, )IE [ ( ; ; ) ]
                 ( ;β,) I .
=









                                                                 .   
 Refutable Implications of the Indirect Utility Function 
For a competitive firm whose objective is to maximize the expected utility of 
random wealth specified by (1), the indirect utility function is defined by:             5
(4)         (β;I,) {E[ ( ( ;β, ) ( ; ; ) I)]} ⋅= ⋅+ ⋅+ % VM a x U ZS ε xx ,                                                    
where U(·) represents the von Neumann Morgenstern utility function, which is increasing 
in wealth, therefore is increasing in nonrandom part of wealth, Z(x; β, ·). Let x*(β, I, ·) 
denote the optimal input variables which are determined by (4). Under the assumptions of 
(1) and (2), the indirect utility function defined by (4) implies the following propositions 
(Saha and Shumway, 1998): 
Proposition 1: The indirect utility function defined by (1) has the following first-order 
curvature properties:                                                                                                              
(i) Increasing in I,                                                                                                                
(ii) Increasing (decreasing) in β if Z is increasing (decreasing) in β. 
Proposition 2: The second-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function 
indicate:                                                                                                                                
(i) V quasiconvex in β and I if Z is convex in β,   
(ii) V quasiconvex in β and I ⇔ Ω symmetric and positive semidefinite (SPSD),                                             
where
**
ββ β β I β {} Z ZZ Ω≡ + − х хх .
1 
Corollary: Under risk neutrality or CARA, xI*=0, and Z convex in β  ββ β β ⇔+ ZZ
*
хх  is 
SPSD.  
Obviously, V(β; I, ·) is increasing in I. Proposition 1(ii) indicates that the first-
order curvature properties of the indirect utility function corresponding to β can be 
revealed by the first-order curvature characters of the nonrandom part of wealth Z(x; β, ·).  
Proposition 2(i) implies the fundamental second-order curvature properties of the indirect 
                                                 
1  The following notation is used throughout this paper: hx denotes the partial derivative of h(·) with respect 
to x, hxy represents the Hessian matrix whose ij
th element is
2 /
ij hx y ∂ ∂∂ , where h(·) is a real-value function of  
vectors x and y.  6
utility function which can be explored by observing the properties of the second-order 
curvature of Z(x; β, ·). By proposition 2(i), V(β; I, ·) is quasi-convex in β if Z is convex in 
β. This property implies and is implied by the testable postulates contained in proposition 
2(ii). In proposition 2(ii), the symmetric and positive semi-definite (SPSD) matrix, Ω, 
which contains the comparative static and reciprocity results demonstrating the firm 
behaviors, includes the complete set of the refutable implications for the competitive firm 
under risk. Most importantly, propositions 1 and 2 do not rely on specific forms of U(·) 
that would otherwise impose an explicit risk preference (Love and Buccola, 1991; Saha, 
Shumway and Talpaz, 1994).  When combined with the empirically testable curvature 
properties of Z(x; β, ·), they allow us to test the behavioral postulates without assuming a 
specific functional form for the indirect utility function.   
  These refutable propositions derived by Saha and Shumway (1998) have been 
empirically tested only under output price uncertainty. One important theoretical 
contribution of this paper, the importance of which will be explained in the next section, 
is to demonstrate that the propositions hold even without assumption (2). From the proof 
in Saha and Shumway (1998), it is obvious that proposition 1 and proposition 2(ii) aren’t 
conditioned on assumption (2), and all that is needed for them to hold is assumption (1). 
We refer readers to Saha and Shumway (1998) for the details. Before proving that 
proposition 2(i) holds without assumption (2), we claim the following result.  
 Claim. The firm’s optimization problem defined in (4) is equivalent to a 
constrained optimization problem where x and W  are jointly chosen. Defining 
{,  } W = k х and  λ= {β, I}, then:  7
(5)           max E [ ( ;β,) ( ; ;) I ]
          max{ E [ ( ; ; ) E( ( ; ; ))] |  ( ;β,) E [ ( ; ;) ] I } .
VU ZS
VU W S SW Z S
ε
εε ε
=⋅ + ⋅ +







 Proof: First, we demonstrate that the constraint,  (; β,) E [ ( ; ;) ] I WZ S ε ≤ ⋅+ ⋅ + % xx , 
will be binding for all optimal values of  and  W x . Suppose the constraint is not binding, 
then there must exist some parameter values
00 0 0 0 0 { , }  and  {β , I } W == k x λ  such that 
00 0 {,  }   W = k x and 
00 0 {β , I } = λ maximize the indirect utility, given by (5), with the 
following condition  
00 0 0 0 (6)         ( ;β ,) E [ ( ; ;) ] I WZ S ε <⋅ + ⋅ + % xx .  
Therefore, there exists some 
0 '> WW  such that  
00 0 0 (7)         ' E ' ( ;β ,) I E ( ; ;) , WW Z S ε == ⋅ + + ⋅ % xx                                                                    
which implies 
0 {,  ' } W x is feasible. 
Since the utility function is increasing in wealth, we have 
00 0 00 (8)        E ( ' ( ; ; ) E[ ( ; ; )]) E ( ( ; ; ) E[ ( ; ; )]) UW S S UW S S εε εε +⋅ − ⋅ >+⋅ − ⋅ %% %% xx xx , 
which contradicts the fact that 
00 0 0 0 0 { , }  and  {β , I } W == k x λ maximize the indirect 
utility. Thus, the constraint is binding for all optimal values of and  k λ, and the claim is 
proved by substituting the binding constraint  E( ; β,) I E ( ; ;) WW Z S ε = =⋅ + + ⋅ % xx into (5). 
  With claim 1 proven, we can now prove that proposition 2(i) is implied by 
assumption (1). Let  (k, ) Z( ;β,) E ( ; ;) I , HW S ε =− ⋅ − ⋅ − % λ xx which is non-positive. Then 
(5) is equivalent to the following expression: 
(9)         ( , ) max{ E [ ( ; ; ) E( ( ; ; ))] |  ( , ) 0} ⋅= + ⋅− ⋅ ≤ %% VU W S S H εε
k kk xx λ .                                8
If ( ;β,) Z ⋅ x is convex inβ ,  ββ Z0 ≥  and  ββ Z0 − ≤ . The Hessian matrix of ( , ) H k λ with 















 − ∂∂ ∂   ==   ∂∂ 

∂∂ ∂  
. 
Let  ', ''  and  λλ λ be any feasible vectors such that '+(1- ) '',  0   1, tt t = ≤≤ λλ λ  and 
kdenotes the optimal vector corresponding to λ . Under the conditions  ββ Z0 −≤  
and| | 0 D = , D is negative semi-definite, which implies  ( , ) H k λ  is quasiconcave 
in (β,I) = λ . Therefore, the following inequality holds: 
(11)        min{ ( , '),  ( , '')} ( , ) 0, HH H ≤ ≤ kk k λλ λ                                                         
which is sufficient to ensure that either  ( , ') 0 or  ( , '') 0 HH ≤ ≤ kk λλ or both. Therefore, 
(12)         ( , ) max{ ( ', ), ( '', )} ⋅≤ ⋅ ⋅ VV V λλ λ .  
By definition, the inequality in (12) implies that  ( ) V ⋅ is quasiconvex in  λ.  
Testable Hypotheses 
  Consider a firm’s production function that has the following general form:                      
(13)          () , Y f ε =+ % Yx                                                                                                        
and random price denoted by:                                                                                             
(14)         , =+ %
P ε ΡΡ                                                                                                         
where  % Y is random output quantity; f(x), a function of input vectors x, is called the mean 
output function; % Ρ denotes random price; Ρ is the mean of price; Y ε  and P ε  are stochastic  9
terms which represent random production shock and random price shock respectively; 
E( ) 0 = Y ε  andE( ) 0 P ε = . Letting r = {r1, …, rn}’ be the price vector of inputs, random 
wealth under output price and output quantity uncertainty will be:                                                           
(15)         I W =⋅− ⋅+ r %% Ρ Υ x  =  () () I . YP P Y ff εε ε ε + ⋅+⋅ +⋅− ⋅ + r Ρх Ρ х х          
  In terms of the notation in the preceding section, r corresponds to β, the 
nonrandom part of wealth is: 
(16)         ( ; , ) Z ⋅ r х = () I , f ⋅− ⋅ + r Ρх х  
and the random component of wealth is: 
(17)         ( ; ) S ε ⋅ % х;  = P () . ⋅+⋅ +⋅ YP Y f ε εε ε Ρх  
Therefore,E[ ( ; ; )] E[ ( ) ] E( ) ⋅= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ % Y P PY PY Sf ε εε ε ε ε ε хΡ х . Under the assumption 
of no correlation between output prices and quantities,E( ) 0 ⋅ = PY ε ε and thus 
E[ ( ; ; )] 0, S ε ⋅= % х  which is consistent with assumption (2).  
  For an individual firm operating in a competitive market,E( ) 0 ⋅ = PY ε ε because 
the firm’s decisions cannot affect the general equilibrium of the market. However, much 
empirical analysis, including ours, uses data for aggregates of firms.  Sometimes that is 
for convenience and other times it is necessary because essential firm-level data don’t 
exist.  Even though the decisions of individual price-taking firms can’t affect the market 
equilibrium, the collective decisions of many firms can. Thus, since we have 
demonstrated that assumption (2) is unnecessary for any of the previous implications to 
hold, it is clear that we can make use of aggregate data, if necessary, to conduct empirical 
tests of both propositions.  10
  With random wealth under output price and output quantity uncertainty defined as 
in equations (15), (16) and (17), the indirect utility function becomes: 
(18)         ( ;I, ) {E[ ( ( ; , ) ( ; ; ) I)]}. ⋅= ⋅+ ⋅+ % VM a x U ZS ε rr хх  
By proposition 1(ii), the firm’s indirect utility function, V(r; I, ·), is decreasing in r since 
the firm’s expected profit, i.e., a nonrandom portion of wealth, decreases in r. Applying 
the envelope theorem to (16), proposition 1(ii) can thus be translated to the following:                                     
(19)        
* 0 == −<
S
VZ rr х ,                                                                                                    
where
S
= denotes ‘same sign as’. The result in (19) is the first-order curvature property of 
the indirect utility function.  It indicates that, as input prices increase, the terminal wealth 
of the producer diminishes and leads to a decrease in the utility of final wealth.   By again 
applying the envelope theorem, Zrr = -xr
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*. Using this result, the second-order curvature result of proposition 2(ii) 
translates to:                                              
(21a)         V(r; I, ·) quasiconvex in r and I 
** *
I (2 ) ⇔Ω≡− + r хх х is SPSD,                    
which implies the following matrix is symmetric negative semidefinite:                               
(21b)        
** *
I 2. Ψ= + r х хх                                                                                      11
  Specifically, when there are three input variables, (21b) can be rewritten as:                                         
** * ** * ** *
1r1 1I 1 1r2 1I 2 1r3 1I 3
** * ** * ** *
2r1 2I 1 2r2 2I 2 2r3 2I 3
** * ** * ** *
3r1 3I 1 3r2 3I 2 3r3 3I 3
222
(21c)         2 2 2 .
222
x xx x xx x xx
x xx x xx x xx
x xx x xx x xx
 ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅
 ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ 
 ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ 
                                                                           
Equations (19) and (21a)-(21c) reveal that the propositions imply a set of testable 
hypotheses associated with the input responses of the firm operating under output price 
and output quantity uncertainty. Therefore, the propositions implied by the indirect utility 
function can be empirically tested by imposing parameter restrictions on a firm’s demand 
equations. 
III. Empirical Application 
The Data Set 
  Because we lack essential data to conduct tests of these propositions for a broad 
cross-section of individual U.S. firms, the above methodology was applied to annual 
state-level data for the period, 1960-1999.
2 The major data source was the ERS annual 
agricultural output and input series for each of the contiguous 48 states for the period 
1960-1999 (Ball, 2002).  This high-quality aggregate data set includes a comprehensive 
inventory of agricultural output and input prices and quantities compiled using 
theoretically and empirically sound procedures consistent with a gross output model of 
production (see Ball et al., 1999, for details). The data set includes three output groups 
(crops, livestock, and secondary outputs) and four input groups (materials, capital, labor, 
                                                 
2 The theory of the expected utility maximization applies to the individual, in this case the individual firm. 
Although tests of utility maximization have not been reported for state-level data, Lim and Shumway (1992) 
failed to reject the hypothesis that each of the states acted as though they were profit-maximizing firms. 
They used nonparametric testing procedures on annual data for the period 1956-1982, which overlaps with 
the first 23 years of our data period.   12
and land). Initial stock of wealth I was proxied by equity, or "net worth", which measures 
farm business assets minus farm business debt. These data for each state were taken from 
the Farm Balance Sheets (USDA/ERS).   
Lagged output prices were used as proxies for expected output prices. Lagged equity 
was used as a proxy for initial (beginning period) wealth. To partially mitigate the effects 
of trending and autocorrelated data, expected output prices, equity, and current input 
prices were normalized by the price of land. To reduce heteroskedasticity and to permit 
estimation of identical non-intercept coefficients for all states in the panel data set, input 
quantities and normalized equity were scaled by the quantity of land.
3 
Econometric Model 
  Without maintaining any additional hypotheses about the input demand equations, 
we used a quadratic (second-order Taylor-series expansion) functional form to 
approximate the input demand framework. Input demand equations for materials/land, 
capital/land, and labor/land were each estimated as a fixed-effects panel data model: 
2
jj j j 1 j 2 j j (22) 0.5 ' t 0.5 t  j 1,2,3 xe αφ δ δ =+ +Γ + + + =          d z z z ,                                           
where xj is the quantity of the j
th input measured as input per unit of land; d is the vector  
of state dummy variables; the vector  123 1 2 3 {p ,p ,p ,r,r,r,I} = z contains lagged output 
prices pi (for crops, livestock, and secondary outputs), current input prices rj (for materials, 
capital, and labor), and lagged farm equity per unit of land I, each normalized by the price 
of land; the quadratic form of the time variable t=1, . . ., 40, is used as a proxy for 
technological innovations; the error term is denoted by j e ; parameters to be estimated are 
the vectors  jj j , , , α φ Γ  and the scalars 1j 2j , . δ δ  
                                                 
3 Significant (5% level) groupwise heteroskadasticity was still found in the scaled data.    13
  For each individual equation in the demand system specified by (22), fixed effects 
across cross-sectional observations were considered. So that all refutable implications 
under output price and output quantity risk contained in (19) and (21a)-(21c) could be 
tested, no restrictions were imposed on the estimated parameters across the equations.  
Empirical Results 
  We first tested for a 1
st-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process  in the error terms 
for each input demand equation defined in (22). Evidence of an AR(1) process was found 
in each equation with Durbin-Watson test statistics of 0.311, 0.317, and 0.674, 
respectively, for the materials, capital, and labor input demand equations. Subject to the 
assumption that the autoregressive coefficients (rho) within a demand equation were 
identical across states, estimates of rho for the three input demand equations were 0.971, 
0.923, and 0.870, respectively. The data were transformed for 1
st-order autocorrelation 
and used in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation of the system of three 
input demand equations. 
4 Since each equation had the same regressors and no across-
equation restrictions were imposed, the SUR parameter estimates were identical to OLS 
estimates.  The SUR estimation procedure was used to permit across-equation tests to be 
conducted, as required for proposition 2. 
  The estimates of the input demand equations are reported in Table 1. The R
2 
values for the three equations in (22) were 0.834, 0.542, and 0.791 respectively. For the 
materials input demand equation, 49 of all 85 estimated coefficients and 13 of the 37 
coefficients on variables other than state intercept dummies were significant at the 5% 
level. The corresponding numbers of significant coefficients were 65 and 18 for the 
                                                 
4 Although evidence was found that significant heteroskedasticity exists in these data across states, we were unable to 
transform the data for heteroskedasticity because we had more cross-sectional units than time periods.   14
capital demand equation and 62 and 16 for the labor demand equation. Thus, 1/2 to 3/4 of 
all estimated coefficients were statistically significant at the 5% level.  That included 
most of the coefficients on state dummy variables. A little more than 1/3 to 1/2 of the 
estimated coefficients on other variables were statistically significant. 
  Hypothesis tests of the propositions and corollary were conducted on the 
estimated parameters at the data means. These results, as well as a tabulation of predicted 
values consistent with the hypotheses at each observation, are presented in Table 2. 
Proposition 1 was examined by testing whether each of the three predicted input demands 
in equation (22) was positive. These test results are listed as propositions 1.1-1.3 in Table 
2.  The null hypothesis of a zero input demand level was rejected in favor of positive 
predicted input demands at the data means for each input at a 1% significant level. In 
addition, nearly all the predicted input quantities are strictly positive at individual 
observations. Among 1872 observations, only 11 predicted capital quantities and one 
predicted labor quantity were found to violate the first-order curvature properties. 
The second proposition that 
** *
I (2 ) Ω≡− + r хх х  is symmetric positive 
semidefinite was tested by the equivalent specification that 
** *
I 2 Ψ= + r хх х is 
symmetric negative semidefinite. To test this proposition, three individual tests (tests 2.1-
2.3 in Table 2) were conducted for negative semidefiniteness and a joint test (test 3 in 
Table 2) for symmetry. The tests for negative semidefiniteness involved tests that all the 
leading principal minors of Ψ alternative in signs, starting with a nonpositive first leading 
principal minor, i.e., the first diagonal element. None of the refutable behavioral 
hypotheses implied by second-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function 
was rejected at the data means. Although both the second leading principal minor (test  15
2.2) and the determinant (test 2.3) of Ψ had unexpected signs at the data means, they 
were not significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. Considerably 
more evidence of second-order curvature violations was found at individual observations 
than of first-order condition violations, but they didn’t excess 25% of the observations for 
any of the tests. 
The test results for symmetry ofΨ are presented in test 3 in Table 2. The three 
symmetric restrictions were rejected at the 5% significance level by the joint test 
conducted at data means. Thus, the hypothesis implied by proposition 2 that Ω is 
symmetric positive semidefinite is statistically rejected at this data point. Whether 
rejection of symmetry constitutes a rejection of the hypothesis that the collection of firms 
in each state act as though they were a single expected utility-maximizing firm, or 
whether it simply implies that the indirect utility function is not twice continuously 
differentiable at the data means is ambiguous from these test results. Unfortunately, we 
are unable to resolve the ambiguity in this paper. 
Decision making consistent with constant absolute risk aversion or risk neutrality 
implies three restrictions on input demand responses. The result (test 4 in Table 2) 
indicates that these restrictions were rejected by the joint test at the data means at the 5% 
significance level.  
  Our results using state-level aggregates were similar in a number of respects to 
Saha and Shumway’s (1998) findings about output price risk for Kansans wheat farmers. 
However, we found less support in the aggregate data than they found in the firm-level 
data for symmetry of the indirect utility function. Our conclusions about first-order 
curvature properties and the nature of producers’ risk preference were the same as theirs.  16
The extant literature has not reached a consensus regarding the nature of farmers’ risk 
preferences (Goodwin and Mishra, 2002), but a few have found empirical support for the 
hypothesis of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).  Among those are the work of 
Park and Antonovitz (1992a, 1992b) who failed to reject CARA for California feedlots.  
IV Conclusions 
This study has extended the Saha and Shumway (1998) model of a competitive 
firm operating under output price risk to a firm operating under both output price and 
output quantity risk. One important theoretical contribution to the previous literature is 
that the refutable propositions implied by the indirect utility function are shown to hold 
without one of the previously maintained hypotheses. Therefore, the only conditions 
required for the propositions to hold are: (a) random wealth can be structured as three 
parts – a nonrandom part of profit, a random part of profit, and nonrandom initial wealth, 
and (b) there exists an optimal input vector that maximizes the expected utility function. 
Both are common assumptions in the firm theory under uncertainty. Without requiring 
the previously imposed assumption that the expectation of the random part of profit is 
zero, the propositions can be empirically applied to varied market structures by 
permitting tests when there is a nonzero correlation between the error terms of random 
output price and random output quantity.  
Moreover, a set of testable hypotheses associated with input responses under 
multiple sources of risk were derived from these propositions, and empirically tested for 
aggregates of firms under both output price and output quantity risk. This is the first 
study using an aggregate state-level panel data to empirically test for utility-maximizing  17
behavior by considering each aggregate as though it were an expected utility-maximizing 
firm. Aggregate agricultural production data for these states have previously been found 
to approximate nonparametric conditions for consistent behavior with this hypothesis. 
  Parametric findings from this study show that the behavioral postulates implied by 
the first-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function could not be rejected at 
the data means, and the data at nearly all individual observations were consistent with 
these properties. The second-order curvature properties were also not rejected at the data 
means, but up to 25% of the observations were inconsistent with the hypotheses. 
However, the symmetry property implied by a twice continuously differentiable indirect 
utility function was soundly rejected at the data means. The empirical evidence also 
failed to support ad hoc risk preference assumptions of either risk neutrality or constant 
absolute risk aversion. 
  18
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c  Estimated 
 coefficient
b  SE




d1 0.218*** 0.032  0.132***  0.014  0.359***  0.072 
d2 0.091*** 0.032  0.087***  0.014  0.239***  0.074 
d3 0.035    0.031  0.028** 0.014 0.134*  0.072 
d4 0.239*** 0.030  0.132***  0.013  0.730***  0.067 
d5 0.047    0.031  0.061*** 0.014 0.162**  0.074 
d6 0.170*** 0.031  0.284***  0.014  1.068***  0.069 
d7 0.739*** 0.030  0.301***  0.013  0.722***  0.067 
d8 0.112*** 0.031  0.075***  0.014  0.413***  0.068 
d9 0.235*** 0.031  0.156***  0.014  0.435***  0.069 
d10 0.114*** 0.031  0.171***  0.014  0.362*** 0.069 
d11 0.070** 0.031  0.089***  0.014  0.266***  0.072 
d12 0.092*** 0.031  0.180***  0.014  0.310*** 0.068 
d13 0.138*** 0.031  0.230***  0.014  0.454*** 0.068 
d14 0.075** 0.031  0.093***  0.014  0.230***  0.071 
d15 0.091*** 0.031  0.157***  0.014  0.435*** 0.069 
d16 0.086*** 0.031  0.102***  0.014  0.278*** 0.069 
d17 0.125*** 0.031  0.259***  0.014  1.070*** 0.069 
d18 0.309*** 0.031  0.288***  0.013  0.755*** 0.067 
d19 0.146*** 0.034  0.252***  0.015  0.730*** 0.077 
d20 0.200*** 0.031  0.307***  0.014  0.786*** 0.069 
d21 0.178*** 0.031  0.227***  0.014  0.567*** 0.069 
d22 0.115*** 0.031  0.165***  0.014  0.465*** 0.069 
d23 0.131*** 0.031  0.099***  0.014  0.273*** 0.071 
d24 -0.026   0.033 0.043***  0.015  0.159**  0.079  21











c  Estimated 
 coefficient
b  SE




d25 0.191*** 0.031  0.158***  0.014  0.516*** 0.069 
d26 0.018   0.033  0.076*** 0.015 0.198***  0.077 
d27 0.127*** 0.031  0.107***  0.014  0.295*** 0.070 
d28 0.086*** 0.031  0.202***  0.014  0.716*** 0.070 
d29 0.156*** 0.031  0.529***  0.014  1.234*** 0.067 
d30 -0.011   0.033 0.039***  0.015  0.158**  0.079 
d31 -0.041   0.037 0.033**  0.017  0.092 0.086 
d32 0.184*** 0.031  0.283***  0.014  0.757*** 0.070 
d33 0.145*** 0.031  0.290***  0.014  0.650*** 0.068 
d34 0.041   0.031  0.068*** 0.014 0.237***  0.071 
d35 0.125*** 0.031  0.100***  0.014  0.369*** 0.070 
d36 0.221*** 0.031  0.305***  0.014  1.000*** 0.069 
d37 0.097*** 0.031  0.302***  0.014  1.012*** 0.070 
d38 0.158*** 0.031  0.177***  0.014  0.518*** 0.069 
d39 0.033   0.031  0.079*** 0.014 0.198***  0.074 
d40 0.065** 0.031  0.122***  0.014  0.361***  0.071 
d41 0.022   0.031  0.054*** 0.014 0.165**  0.072 
d42 0.015   0.032  0.056*** 0.014 0.171**  0.075 
d43 0.008   0.031  0.128*** 0.014 0.347***  0.070 
d44 0.110*** 0.033  0.155***  0.015  0.493*** 0.074 
d45 0.121*** 0.031  0.139***  0.014  0.469*** 0.069 
d46 0.249*** 0.031  0.347***  0.014  0.993*** 0.070 
d47 0.0714** 0.031  0.135***  0.014  0.435*** 0.071 
d48 0.003   0.031  0.047*** 0.014 0.157**  0.075  22











c  Estimated 
 coefficient
b  SE




p1 -0.048*** 0.010  -0.006  0.004  0.032  0.024 
p2 0.0602*** 0.012  0.017***  0.006  -0.064** 0.031 
p3 -0.034** 0.021 -0.019**  0.011  0.023  0.062 
r1 0.118***  0.044  0.002  0.022  0.321***  0.119 
r2 -0.046**  0.019  0.003  0.009  0.038 0.051 
r3 0.0002  0.023  -0.044*** 0.012  -0.379***  0.072 
I 0.003***  0.001  0.0003  0.000  0.002 0.002 
p1
2 0.015  ** 0.007  -0.008**  0.003  -0.017  0.018 
p1 p2 -0.005  0.011 0.014***  0.006  0.076** 0.029 
p1 p3 -0.017  0.020  0.008  0.009  0.001  0.046 
p1r1 0.033   0.039  0.004  0.016  -0.043  0.075 
p1r2 -0.027   0.016  0.0002  0.007  -0.023 0.034 
p1r3 0.021   0.025  -0.016  0.011  0.059 0.055 
p1I -0.001    0.001  -0.003*** 0.001  -0.016***  0.003 
p2
2 0.017    0.020  -0.022** 0.009  -0.197***  0.044 
p2 p3 -0.008   0.023  0.017  0.010  0.182***  0.048 
p2r1 -0.120**   0.048  -0.069***  0.020  -0.162** 0.094 
p2r2 0.018   0.021  0.002  0.009  0.069 0.045 
p2r3 0.02806 0.038  0.019  0.017  -0.060  0.086 
p2I 0.0003    0.002  0.001*  0.001  0.009**  0.003 
p3
2 0.077    0.047  0.002  0.019  -0.122  0.087 
p3r1 0.096   0.094  0.058  0.037  0.074 0.168 
p3r2 -0.045   0.039  -0.016  0.017  -0.146*  0.080 
p3r3 -0.014   0.058  0.002  0.027  0.239* 0.131  23











c  Estimated 
 coefficient
b  SE




p3I 0.0003    0.004  -0.006*** 0.002 -0.016**  0.007 
r1
2 -0.337** 0.187 -0.192***  0.067  -0.515* 0.298 
r1 r2 0.059   0.053  0.023  0.021  0.079 0.103 
r1 r3 0.206*  0.115 0.138***  0.044  0.230  0.201 
r1I 0.008    0.006  0.015*** 0.002 0.048**  0.009 
r2
2 -0.004 0.032 0.002**  0.014  0.053 0.065 
r2r3  -0.040   0.041  -0.041**  0.017  -0.180**  0.080 
r2I
  0.008***   0.003  -0.001  0.001  0.003  0.005 
r3
2 -0.052    0.067  0.004  0.029  0.185 0.139 
r3I -0.010** 0.005  -0.001  0.002 -0.029***  0.008 
I
2  0.0001   0.000  0.001***  0.0001  0.003***  0.0003 
t
  -0.004** 0.002  0.003***  0.001  -0.010***  0.004 
t
2  0.0003*** 0.00008  0.0002***  0.00003  0.0003**  0.0002 
R-Square 0.834
  0.542 0.791 
a Variable codes: p1 is crop price, p2 is livestock price, p3 is secondary output price,  
   r1 is materials input price, r2 is capital input price, r3 is labor input price,  
   I is farm equity, t is the time variable, d1-d48 are state dummy variables. 
b Parameter estimates marked with *** are significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and * at the 10% level. 
c SE is standard error.   24
Table 2. Hypotheses Test Results 
Test at Data Means 









1. V is decreasing in r  
1.1 V is decreasing in r1, 
1 ˆ 0 > x    
1 ˆ 0 x =   AN   98.706  0.000     11 
1.2. V is decreasing in r2, 
2 ˆ 0 > x  
2 ˆ 0 x =   AN     9.963  0.000      0 
1.3 V is decreasing in r3, 
3 ˆ 0 x >   3 ˆ 0 x =   AN    56.521  0.000      1 
2. 
** *
I 2 Ψ= + r хх х is  
negative semidefinite                            
2.1 1




1r 1I 1 20 xx x +⋅≤   = zero  AN   -2.284  0.022  387 
2.2 2
nd leading principal 
minor of  0 Ψ≥   = zero  AN   -1.736  0.083        460 
2.3 Determinant of 
0 Ψ≤   = zero  AN    0.772  0.440   450 
3. Symmetry of Ψ
b  W  71.770  0.000     -- 
4. CARA or RN 
c 
***
1I 2I 3I 0 xxx ===   = zero  W  99.116  0.000     -- 
 
a AN is asymptotic normal test, and W is Wald chi-squared test. 
b Test of symmetry involves jointly testing H0: 
1r 1I 2 1 2
** * ** *
2r 2I 1 22 , x xx x xx ⋅ +⋅= ⋅ +⋅                
     
1r 1I 3 1 3
** * ** *
3r 3I 1 22 , x xx x xx ⋅+⋅ = ⋅+⋅ 
32
** * ** *
2r 2I 3 3r 3I 2 and 2 2 x xx x xx ⋅ +⋅= ⋅+⋅                     
   
c CARA is constant absolute risk aversion, and RN is risk neutrality. 
    